Torts - Damages - Negligent Injury to Husband Does Not Give Wife Action for Loss of Consortium. Rush v. Great American Ins. Co., 376 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1964) by Tucker, James L.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 12
Torts - Damages - Negligent Injury to Husband
Does Not Give Wife Action for Loss of
Consortium. Rush v. Great American Ins. Co., 376
S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1964)
James L. Tucker
Copyright c 1965 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
James L. Tucker, Torts - Damages - Negligent Injury to Husband Does Not Give Wife Action for Loss of
Consortium. Rush v. Great American Ins. Co., 376 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1964), 6 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 97
(1965), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss1/12
CURRENT DECISIONS
not essential in finding liability." It appears that the reasoning behind
the majority is to curtail to the same reasonable extent the defendant's
privilege to act as he sees fit without care for the protection of others. 2
Gus James iI
Torts-DAMAGES-NEGLIGENT INJURY TO HUSBAND DOES NOT GIVE
WIFE ACTION FOR Loss OF CoNsoRTIuM.-In Rush v. Great American
ins. Co.' the plaintiff sued to recover damages for loss of consortim
resulting from injuries negligently inflicted upon her husband by the
defendant. The defendant demurred, alleging that no such action
could be maintained by the wife under common law and that there
was no state statute permitting such an action. The trial court sustained
the demurrer and dismissed the case. Affirming, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee ruled that the common law was, and continues to be, in full
force and effect,2 except, of course, where expressly changed by
statute.3 In its strict adherence to a common law rule which was
originally based upon the inequality of the sexe, this decision stands in
direct opposition to modern social pressures which demand complete
legal equality for the married woman. It is obviously of great im-
portance to understand why, in the face of desirable reform, this court
has decided to support that ancient common law principle.
Although there is no universally accepted definition of the word
"consortium,"' 4 it generally refers to "conjugal fellowship; and the
term embraces love, companionship, affection, society, comfort, sexual
11. With the exception of Virginia, West Virginia, PROSSER AND SMITH, TORTS 492
(3rd Ed. 1962) and New York, Weisbein, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine and Its
Status in New York, 8 N.Y.U. INTRAMURAL L. REv. 224 T1953), who purport to reject
the whole theory of attractive nuisance and find liability under certain exceptions,
the remaining states follow the Best case, supra, note 5, and the RESTATEMENT, ToPrS,
S 339 (1934) and hold that enticement and allurement are not necessary before liability.
12. Wilson, Limitations on the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 1 N.CJL. Rnv. 162
(1923); James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land, 63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
1. 376 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1964).
2. Accord, Cogburn v. State, 198 Tenn. 431, 281 S.W.2d 38 (1955).
3. TENN. CoNsT. ART. XI, § 1; accord, Henley v. State, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S.W. 352,
39 L.R.A. 126 (1897).
4. E.g., Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1963);
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 23 A.L.R. 1366 (D.C. Cit. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852, (1950); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480, 481 (1956);
Roseberry v. Starkovich, 387 P.2d 321, 322 (N.M. 1963); Hinnant v. Tide Water Power
Co., 187 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307, 37 A.L.R. 889 (1929). See generally BLcK, LAW
DinO,oARY 382 (4th ed. 1957).
19651
WILLIAMN AND IARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:97
relations, services, solace and more." 5 Under the earlier common law,
whatever the particular definition used, no right of consortium ever
belonged to the wife. This right was considered a property right, and,
as such, it belonged exclusively to the husband." Its invasion gave the
husband a right of action in trespass for loss of the services of his wife
(trespass per quod consortium amisit) .7 In regard to the right of con-
sortium, the common law view has existed practically unchanged down
to modern times. The first reported American case in which a wife
sued a third party for loss of consortium was Welsh v. Morrison8 in
1887, and not until 1950 did any American court ever allow the wife
to recover such damages.
The great majority of legal writers had long advocated giving the
wife the right to sue for loss of consortium; 9 nevertheless, not until
Hitaffer v. Argonne' bestowed judicial recognition upon this view did
the courts earnestly begin to scrutinize the concept of consortium. The
Hitaffer case was the impetus for a great increase in litigation concerning
the rights of a married woman to consortium, and it has given rise to
a small, but strong, minority which grants such rights to the wife."
Although the Hitaffer decision admittedly contains sound and logical
reasoning and even though the majority of courts do grant a remedy
5. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227, 228 (1960).
6. See 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 143.
7. Hyde v. Scyssor, Cro. Jac. 538, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (1621); Guy v. Livesay, Cro. Jac.
501, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1620).
8. 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 852, 17 W.L.B. 370 (1887).
9. E.g., PROSSER, TORTS 948 (1941); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Con-
sortium, 22 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1923); Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortiun, 30
COLUM. L. REv. 651 (1930). But see, Pound, Individual Interests in Domestic Relations,
14 MICH. L. REv. 177, 194 (19M6).
10. Supra, note 4. Partially overruled in matters not concerning the present discus-
sion by Smith & Co. v. Cole, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
914 (1957).
11. Nine state courts and the federal courts of two other states presently follow the
pro-wife view of the Hitaffer case and grant the wife recovery for loss of consortium
resulting from negligent injury to her husband: Ark.-Missouri Pacific Transp. Co. v.
Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 229 S.W.2d 241 (1957); Del.-Stenta v. Leblang, 185 A.2d 759
(Del. 1962); Ga.-Walden v. Coleman, 105 Ga. App. 242, 124 S.E.2d 313 (1962); IIl.-
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 1ll.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881, 86 A.L.R.2d 1184 (1960); Iowa-
Lampe v. Lagomarcino-Grupe Co., 251 Iowa 204, 100 N.W.2d 1 (1959); Alich.-Mont-
gomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Miss.-Delta Chevrolet Co.
v. Ward, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 443 (1957); Mo.-Novak v. Kansas City Transit Inc., 365
S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Mont.-Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Constr. Co., 214
F.Supp. 298 (D.C. Mont. 1963) (applying Mont. law); Neb.-Guyton v. Solomon De-
hydrating Co., 302 F.2d 283 (8th Ci. 1962) (applying Neb. law); S.D.-Hoekstra v.
Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959).
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for a direct attack by a third party upon the marital relation, 2 the
great majority of courts still steadfastly refuse to give the wife any
right of action where the interference is indirect and is the result of
negligence. 3
The majority view, relying upon the time-honored common law and
upon the principle of stare decisis, explicitly declares that any change in
the present law of consortium must be made by the legislature and not
by the courts.14  One of the principal arguments used in denying re-
covery to the wife is that her injury, if any, is too remote, consequential,
speculative, and too infused with sentimental elements; thus, her damages
are incapable of reasonable ascertainment. 15 Another reason why the
courts refuse to allow recovery by the wife stems from their appre-
12. I.e., enticement, alienation of affections, and criminal conversation. See PRossER,
TORTS 691 (2d ed. 1955).
13. Of the states which have considered the question since 1950, the following
refuse to allow the wife to recover: Ala.-Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala.
42, 122 So.2d 153 (1960); Ariz.-Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269
P.2d 723 (1954); Cal.-West v. San Diego, 54 Cal.2d 469, 6 Cal. Rptr. 289, 353 P.2d
929 (1960); Colo.-Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101, 286 P.2d 630 (1955); Conn.-
Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co, 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); Fla.- Wilson
v. Redding, 145 So.2d 252 (Fla. App. 1962); Ind.-Miller v. Sparks, 189 N.E.2d 720
(Ind. App. 1963); Kan.-Hoffman v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615 (1964); Ky.-
Baird v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 368 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1963); Md.-Coastal Tank
Lines, Inc. v. Candes, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955); Minn.-State Farm Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Village of Isle, 122 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1963); N.H.-Snodgrass v. Cherry-Burrell
Corp., 103 N.H. 56, 164 A.2d 579 (1960); N.J.-Larocca v. American Chain & Cable
Co., 23 N.J. Super. 195, 92 A.2d 811 (1952); N.M.-Roseberry v. Starkovich, 387 P.2d
321 (N.M. 1963); N.Y.-Heller v. Spyridon, 37 Misc.2d 474, 235 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1962);
Okla.-Nelson v. A.M. Lockett & Co, 206 Okla. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952); Pa.-Neuberg
v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960); S.C.-Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126
S.E.2d 570 (1962); Wash.-Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 48 WVash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953);
TV. Va.-Seagraves v. Legg, 127 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1962); IVis.-Sestito v. Knop,
297 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 961) (applying Wis. law).
14. "[W]e can but say that it is not our function to change the law, but to deter-
mine what it is. The former is vested totally in the legislature." Smith v. United
Constr. Workers, supra note 13, at 155; Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
"The primary function of this court is to interpret and apply the law to given
situations. To legislate is wholly foreign to our duty." Rush v. Great American Ins.
Co., supra note 11, at 458. But see 15 Am. JuR. 2d § 2, p. 795 (1964).
15. Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958);
Marri v. Stamford Street R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582, 33 L.R.A. (ns.) 1042, Ann. Cas.
1912B 1120 (1911); Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631, 40 L.R.A. (n.s.) 236
(1912); Feneff v. New York C. & H. Ry., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436, 24 L.R.A. (ns.)
1024, 133 Am. St. Rep. 291 (1909); Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 NN.Y.S.
534 (1934). See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378, 1380 (1952). Contra, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
supra note 4.
1965]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
hension of a double recovery for a single injury.16 Technically, the
minority view is correct in stating that the respective damages of the
husband and wife are separable; however, from a practical viewpoint,
and because such actions are generally allowed to go before the jury,
there is a real possibility of overlapping recoveries.17
The majority of courts do not consider their denial of the wife's
action inconsistent with allowing the husband to recover for loss of
consortium resulting from a negligent injury to his wife. This position
is based generally upon the premise that the husband has a common
law right to his spouse's services, whereas the wife has no corresponding
right to her husband's services.' 8 Thus, the husband has a base upon
which the sentimental elements of damage may attach, while the wife
does not. 19
Neither can the wife find refuge in the various married women's acts,
for in the great majority of jurisdictions these acts are interpreted
as merely having removed the liabilities which were formerly imposed
upon females, and not as having created any new rights which were
unknown to the common law.20 Nor can the married woman gain her
right of action in those few states which, in view of the married
women's acts, recognize the incongruity of denying such an action to
the wife while granting it to her husband. These states, either by
16. Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937); Eschenbach
v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 N.J.L. 66,
114 At. 153 (1921); Helmststler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 33 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 219, 229 (1953).
17. "Adjectives, adverbs and epithets can neither solve nor eliminate the problem.
When two overlapping causes of action are made to grow where one has grown before,
the possibility of a double recovery is real." Dini v. Naiditch, supra note 11, at 895
(dissenting opinion).
18. Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354, 151 N.E.2d
898 (1958); Smith v. Nicolas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204, L.R.A. 1916E 700,
Ann. Cas. 1918D 206 (1915); accord, Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 639.
Contra, Dini v. Naiditch, supra note 11.
19. See Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378, 1380 (1952).
20. "A right may exist in the husband, which, notwithstanding the statute, is without
a correlative right in the wife." Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 195, 104 Atl. 538, 539
(1918). "The Act which removed the married women's disabilities of coverture in 1913,
T.C.A. 5 36-601, did not confer any substantive rights of action upon women but
merely removed their common law disabilities. Rush v. Great American Ins. Co.,
rupra note 1. "The statute . . . being in derogation of the common law, was to be
strictly construed and read as if the common law remained unchanged unless the purpose
to change it appeared expressly or by necessary implication." Furey v. Furey, 193




statute, -1 or by decision,"2 solve the whole problem by denying the
action to the husband also, thereby placing both parties to the marital
relationship upon more or less equal terms.
The common law denial of the wife's right to sue for loss of con-
sortium is admittedly incompatible with the modem concept of legal
equality for the married woman; however, in order to bring any
semblance of uniformity and effectiveness to the solution of this
problem, and in order to give true and complete equality to the wife,
legislative action is imperative. 3 Until such action materializes, the
courts will continue to resist any complete breach of the long-estab-
lished doctrines of the common law.2 Certainly, without statutory
directives it would be extremely difficult and time-consuming for the
courts to agree upon what elements such an action by the wife should
include and upon what limits should be imposed upon the action. Con-
sidering the nonpecuniary nature of the interests involved, the allowance
of such action would involve the unsystematic inclusion and exclusion
of the various elements of damage by means of slowly evolving court-
made doctrines whose rules would be subject to change with each new
decision.- .
One must bear in mind the fact that, regardless of the desirability
of changing a particular facet of the common law, the courts are ex-
tremely reluctant to invade the province of the legislators and become
lawmakers.20 Although pressured by a society which demands equality
for women, it appears that the majority view continues to hold sway
21. VA. CODE 1950, § 55-36, as construed in Carey v. Foster, 221 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.
Va. 1963).
22. Rogers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943); Helmsteter v. Duke
Power Co., supra note 16; accord, Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., supra note 18.
23. See note 14, supra.
24. "We have given careful consideration to the able arguments advanced in the
Hitaffer case, many of which are founded on sound reasoning and which logically
support the conclusion reached if considered as an argument of what the law should
be. They might appeal to the Legislature. But we find them wholly unconvincing
when viewed from the only angle from which our jurisdiction permits us to consider
them, namely a determination of what the law of Florida is ... " Ripley v. Ewell, 61
So.2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1952).
25. "Clarification by statute as to both the husband and wife would, of course,
be preferable to piecemeal determination of the problems by judicial decision." Hoffman
v. Dautel, 388 P.2d 615, 626 (Kan. 1964).
26. E.g., "We are mindful of the critical comments of the law writers and some of
the courts against adhering to a static principle long embedded in our jurisprudence, but
much can be said on either side of the question and we think it sound to adhere to the
legal concept so long established in this jurisdiction." Ex parte Hammett, 259 Ala. 240,
243, 66 So.2d 600, 602 (1953).
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over the courts and is continually being re-examined, clarified, and
strengthened by decisions such as Rush v. Great American Ins. Co."7
Such decisions do not refute the logical reasoning of the opposition,
nor do they ignore the pressures of social change-indeed, courts of law
thrive on logic and welcome desirable change. These decisions merely
propose that such a change should come from the legislature; until
such change is forthcoming, the time-proven common law will govern.
James L. Tucker
27. Supra norc 1.
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